JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Immerman ( A clear view of the "Guatemalan affair" also promises to enrich our understanding of enduring themes in the international relations of the Western Hemisphere. In the 1980s "cold war" rhetoric has reappeared in official U.S. policymaking circles and in the popular press to describe the struggles for national identity in Central America primarily in terms of a Cuban-communist threat. Similar denigrations of the Guatemalan quest for self-determination preceded Arbenz' downfall. Though the structure of the entire international system to a degree has changed in the interim, the United States remains the preeminent military power in the Caribbean-Central American region. Thus, clear thinking about the "Guatemalan affair" may help us to anticipate the types of conditions which in the contemporary situation may lead U.S. policymakers to perceive that a basic threat to U.S. interests exists in the region.
DOMESTIC FACTORS IN THE "GUATEMALAN AFFAIR"
Actions following the inauguration of the Arbenz government caused a reassessment in U.S. thinking. Union certification standards were relaxed and communist sympathizers were hired to administer labor laws. Also in 1951 the heretofore clandestine communist movement received legal registration for their Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Workers' Party-PGT). U.S. displeasure over these changes was communicated to the Guatelaman government. American intelligence regarding Arbenz' policies, however, continued to criticize Arbenz' nationalism, describing it as a separate phenomena from the influence of Moscow or the influence of Guatemalan communists. Writing to President Truman in April 1952, CIA director Walter "Beetle" Smith (1952: 1) stated: "Even if communist influence should be drastically reduced, it is unlikely that there would be any diminution in the manifestations against U.S. companies operating in the country."
The most profound change in domestic factors affecting Guatemalan politics occurred after May 10, 1952, when President Arbenz introduced his agrarian reform ('Decree 900'). This reform was designed "to put an end to feudal properties in farming areas in order to develop capitalistic methods of production . . . [and to] supply land to farmers having little or none of it" (Arbenz, 1952 The most effective single instrument in building Communist influence in Guatemala was patronage ... [a] system that was in many respects similar to that of a ward healer operation in a city political machine.
The effectiveness of such a system partly rests upon its manifest and personalized concern for the little people.
Put another way, the communists were too successful at democratic politics for the United States to allow democracy to survive.
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN THE "GUATEMALAN AFFAIR"
Just as the disunity among antigovernment forces during the 1953-1954 period concerned U.S. officials, it also troubled elements of the Guatemalan officer corps. There had been serious problems with internal security stemming from violence associated with the implementation of the land reform law. Cognizant of early signs of division within the armed forces, the U.S. government developed contacts to insure that any resulting vulnerability would not be used to benefit U.S. adversaries. U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy and his staff made a point of staying in contact with the more disgruntled elements, pointing out in frequent meetings the degree of U.S. displeasure over the role of communists in Arbnez' administration and its uneasiness about the volatility of the social mobilization occurring in the country. U.S. analysts perceived that doubts about Arbenz' ability to protect the special place of the military in Guatemalan society were widespread in the officer corps. They concluded that these doubts could be exploited in such a way as to spark a coup.
By January Efforts by UFCO to encourage U.S. actions were extensive, and the company apparently worked very closely with the CIA in its disinformation campaign, but the efforts should be seen as complementary. They reinforced administration efforts to mold permissive congressional and public opinion. It is undeniable that the effect of U.S. actions was to secure the return of UFCO lands, regardless of the geopolitical intentions or motives of policymakers. Objectively, events unfolded in no substantial way differently than if UFCO's interests had been foremost in the minds of policymakers. But we should not be confused by this. It is the subjective reality which policymakers believe is real in which they make their judgements. Understanding that starkly clear world, one of good and evil, can be a difficult adjustment. But it is a vital adjustment which should be made in order to fashion analogies from history to fit subsequent situations. Fourth, after the affair, the U.S. government instituted tactics which would more efficiently serve the primary objective here, the cultivation of pro-American attitudes in and actions by official military hierarchies. Thus, when regional policy objectives were restated by the National Security Council (NSC, 1954a: 2, 5) later in the summer of 1954 "the ultimate standardization of Latin American military organization, training, doctrine and equipment along U.S. lines" was a priority goal. By increasing weapons sales, training courses and military aid, it was hoped that "understanding of, and orientation toward, U.S. objectives on the part of the Latin American military" would be achieved. By this standard (orientation toward U.S., not national, objectives) future contenders for power would be judged.
In conclusion, the paramount political lesson of the "Guatemalan affair" was that the United States learned to rely on local militaries to serve as junior partners with U.S. covert operatives in the protection of U.S. interests. That this strategy has had an important impact on the role of Latin American militaries in politics is obvious. The corresponding impact on national self-determination of political institutions and socioeconomic priorities can scarcely be overstated. 
